|
www.dartemis.net |
||||
|
|
Copyright Ó
2005-2006 by Rodney G. Graves, all rights reserved. Able Danger: Why it mattersThe recent revelation of Able Danger is significant in several ways. First, in and of itself, it will force a re-writing of the history of the attacks of September 11th, 2001. Second, the revelation of Able Danger has sparked the revelation of other documents and evidence relating to counterterrorism during the run up to the attacks of 9/11. Third, Able Danger illuminates the differences between Military Operations and Judicial Proceedings.Re-Writing the History of 9/11 Intelligence (or at least Military Intelligence) was not the point of failure. The failure was getting the information (a four man cell of Al-Qaeda operatives operating in the United States) to an organization that could do something about it. Able Danger was designed to glean actionable intelligence (intelligence solid enough to justify military operations) for use by the Special Operations Command. The project appears to have been specifically targeted to ferret out terrorist cells. Based on the reported discovery of Mohamed Atta and three other members of the 9/11 action teams, it seems to have been effective. The problem is that the cell in question was located in the United States. The United States Military does not, per the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, conduct law enforcement operations within the United States. In addition, domestic counter intelligence (prior to the PATRIOT ACT) was the exclusive turf of the FBI.
This divide was further reinforced by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978, and further
...we believe that is prudent to establish a set of instructions that will clearly separate the counterintelligence investigation from the more limited, but continued, criminal investigations. These procedures, which go beyond what is legally required, will prevent any risk of creating an unwarranted appearance that FISA is being used to avoid procedural safeguards which would apply in a criminal investigation.The end result of which was that three separate requests on the part of Able Danger to meet with the FBI were cancelled or refused. An outcome, it should be noted, that United States Attorney Mary Jo White predicted in her second memorandum on the subject to then-Deputy Attorney General Gorelick: The omission of any reference to Able Danger, the second White memorandum, and related material is surely sufficient grounds to re-examine the "facts" and "conclusions" presented by the 9/11 Commission in their report. Additional New Leads Since the Able Danger information surfaced, a number of related matters have also come to light.
From the State Department:
Ed Morrisey on Iraqi Spies in Germany
War vs Law Enforcement Prior to 9/11 generally, and especially during the Clinton Administration, counterterrorism was viewed and treated as a law enforcement matter. The 1995 Gorelick memo above, in the words of one FBI agent "Let’s hope the National Security Law Unit will stand behind their decisions then, especially since the biggest threat to us now, UBL, is getting the most 'protection.'" The methods and tactics best suited to frustrating operations such as the 9/11 attack, are not the tactics best suited to obtaining criminal convictions while protecting the rights of the defendant. Which, then, is the priority?
Out Here |